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Article 7
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regarding taxation' 4 has been held to mean one "domiciled" within the
state. 15 On the other hand, a statute providing that "Whoever kidnaps,
or forcibly or fraudulently carries off or decoys from his place of residence,
or arrests or imprisons any person, with the intention of having such
person carried away from his place of residence, unless it be in pursuance
of laws of this state or the United States, is guilty of kidnapping.
*

*

*"16 was for obvious reasons construed not to refer to the legal

"domicile" of the kidnapped individual. The court said "the evident purpose was rather to provide against the kidnapping of a person from any
place where he has a right to be, whether that be the place of his temP. J.D.
porary sojourn or permanent domicile."17
CONSTrrUTIONAL LAw-DuE PROCESS CLAusE-Appellant is a Wisconsin corporation licensed to carry on the business of writing fire insurance
in Minnesota. A fire insurance policy was issued to appellee's assignor
by appellant which was in the standard form as required by a Minnesota
statute, which provided that all insurance policies issued by fire insurance
companies licensed to do business in Minnesota should contain a provision
for determining by arbitration the amount of any loss (except total loss
of building) when the parties fail to agree as to the amount. The statute
provided for the method of selecting appraisors and an umpire by both
parties and also made a provision applicable to the selection in case one
party refused to take part. The decision by this board, unless grossly excessive, or inadequate, or procured by fraud, was by this statute made
conclusive as to the amount of the loss but not as to the liability under
the policy.1 The insured's property was damaged by fire and a demand was
made on appellant to have the amount of the loss determined by arbitration as provided for in the policy. Appellant refused to participate in the
arbitration and appellee proceeded to have the arbitrators selected and the
amount determined by the statutory method provided for in such a case.
This suit was brought to recover the amount of the award. The appellant
contends, and it is the single point relied upon, that so much of the statute
as requires appellant to use the arbitration provision of the policy and
makes the award thus found conclusive is a violation of the due process
and equal protection of laws clauses of the 14th Amendment of the Constitution of the United States. This contention was rejected by the Minnesota
appeal was taken to the United States Supreme
Supreme Court 2 and an
2
Court. Held, affirmed. a
The Supreme Court of the United States has never attempted a precise
definition of the term "due process of law" although the term has often
1

,Burns' Ann. Stat. 1926. See. 14050.
Croop v. Walton (1927), 199 Ind. 262, 157 N. E. 275 (wherein Martin, J., has
made16 a comprehensive discussion of the problem of domicile and residence).
Burns' R. S. 1894, Sec. 1988.
11Wallace v. State (1890), 147 Ind. 621, 47 N. B. 13.
15

1 Mason's Minn. Stat. 1927, Sees. 3314, 3366. 3512, 3515, 3711.
2Glidden Company v. Retail Hardware Mut. Fire Ins. Co. of Minnesota (1930),

181 Minn. 518, 233 N. W. 310.
2aHardware Dealers Mutual Fire Insurance Company v. Glidden Company
(1931), 284 U. S. 151, 62 Sup. Ct. 69.

RECENT CASE NOTES
been generally defined. As to what is due process of law Mr. Justice Field
has said: "The clause in question means therefore, that there can be no
proceeding against life, liberty, or property which may result in the deprivation of either, without the observance of those general rules established
in our system of jurisprudence for the security of private rights."s Many
cases have set down such a general definition,4 but for the most part due
process is interpreted without strict definition in the light of the peculiarities of each individual case. In the ordinary case however, due process as
to procedure may be said to require four important elements; namely, notice
to the parties, 5 an opportunity to be heard,6 an orderly procedure,7 and an
impartial tribunal.8 It is submitted that there is only one element set out
above as necessary to procedural due process that is questionable under the
statute involved here. Was an impartial tribunal given the parties? It has
been repeatedly held that such contracts voluntarily made do not oust the
courts of jurisdiction.9 Commercial Arbitration Acts have also been upheld
as not contrary to due process of law.1o The tribunal here was surely
impartial and a judicial tribunal is not guaranteed in all cases.
The due process clause also protects as to substance but our liberty and
property are subject to the police power of the state which subjects industries to reasonable classification and regulation by the Legislature. It
is the exercise of this police power which makes regulations of some types
of business valid when the regulations are reasonable and a social interest
1
is involved. Therefore, just as there is no absolute freedom of contract,"
3
12
Munn v. I1linois1 introalso there is no absolute right to a jury trial.
duced the doctrine that an industry not in itself public in nature may be3Hagar v. Reclamation District (1884), 111 U. S. 701, 708, 4 Sup. Ct. 663, 28
L. Ed. 568. Citing, Hurtado v. California (1884), 110 U. S. 516, 4 Sup. Ct. 111, 28
L. Ed. 232.
'Board of Education v. Bakewell (1887), 8 West Rep. 52, 122 Ill. 339; Ex.
parte Wall (1882), 107 U. S. 265, 27 L. Ed. 552; Bartlett v. Wilson (1887), 4 New
Eng. Rep. 119, 59 Vt. 23; Davidson v. New Orleans (1877), 96 U. S. 104, 24 1, Ed.
616; Pennoyer v. Neff (1877), 95 U. S. 714, 24 L. Ed. 565; Hennard v. Louisiana
(1875), 92 U. S. 480, 23 L. Ed. 478; Hagar v. Reclamation District (1884), 111 U.
S. 701, 708, 4 Sup. Ct. 663, 28 L. Ed. 569; Murray v. Hoboken L. & L Co. (1855), 18
How. (U. S.) 272, 15 L. Ed. 372.
GKuntz v. Sumption (1889), 117 Ind. 1, 2 L. R. A. 655; Peerce v. Kitzmiller
(1882), 19 W. Va. 564, See. 6, R. C. L., Sec. 433.
"Kuntz v. Sumption (1889), 117 Ind. 1, 2 L. R. A. 655; People v. Essex Co.
(1877), 70 N. Y. 229; Re Michael Gannon (1889), 16 1R.I. 537, 5 I. R. A. 359;
Stuart v. Palmer (1878), 74 N. Y. 190; People -v. O'Brien (1888), 111 N. Y. 1, 2 L.
Rt. A.7 268.
Ex Parte Wall (1882), 107 U. Z. 265, 27 L. Ed. 552; Davidson ,. New Orleans
(1877), 96 U. S. 104, 24 L. Ed. 616.
8
Tumey v. Ohio (1927), 273 U. S. 510, 47 Sup. Ct. 437; Hagar v. Reclamation
District (1884), 111 U. S. 701, 708, 4 Sup. Ct. 663, 28 L. Ed. 569.
9 See collection of cases In 47 L. t. A. (N. S.) 337.
" White Eagle Laundry Co. v. Shewek (1921), 296 II. 240, 129 N. E. 753;
Itaska Paper Co. v. NiagaraFire Ins. Co. (1928), 220 N. W. 425.
uMuller v. Oregon (1908), 208 U. -. 412, 28 Sup. Ct. 324; Friabie v. United
States (1895), 153 U. S. 160, 15 Sup. Ct 586; McLean v. Arkansas (1908), 211 U.
S. 539, 29 Sup. Ct 206; Jacobson v. Mass. (1905), 197 U. S. 11, 25 Sup. Ct. 358.
"Er Parts Wall (1882), 107 U. S. 265, 27 L. Ed. 552; Bartlett v. Wilson
(1887), 4 New Eng. Rep. 119, 59 Vt. 23; Walker v. eauvinet (1875), 92 U. S. 90,
23 L. Ed. 678; Hallinger v. Davis (1892), 146 U. S. 314, 13 Sup. Ct. 105.
IMunn v. Illinois (1876), 94 U. S. 113, 24 L. Ed. 77.
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come affected with a public interest because of the nature of the business
and the position it occupies in the economic and industrial life of the people. In Wolff Packing Companyi v. The Court of Industrial Relztions,14 the
court classified industries affected with a public interest as follows: (a)
those which are carried on under authority of public grant which imposes
a duty to render public service, (b) certain exceptional occupations which
have from earliest times been regarded as subject to regulation, and (c)
businesses which, though not public in inception, may be said to have
become such and have thus become subject to regulation (because of virtual
monopoly and indispensable service). It would appear then, and it was so
conceded by the appellant in the instant case, that fire insurance companies
are affected with a public interest and subject to regulation by the state
under its police power.
The United States Supreme Court in the instant case took judicial
notice of the following: that arbitration clauses have long been inserted
voluntarily in insurance policies, that the amount of the loss is fruitful
and often the only subject of controversy, that speedy determination of
such liability is a matter of wide concern, and that for such appraisal
expert knowledge and prompt inspection of the property is more easily
available by arbitration method than "in the more deliberate processes of
a judicial proceeding."
There can be no doubt that such a regulation in the case of a public
calling provides for due process of law both as to procedure and substance, 15
and, with the above consideration in mind, perhaps such a social interest
has been found as to render such a regulation reasonable and not arbitrary and therefore providing for procedural and substantive due process
of law even as to a business not in a class of public calling.16
J. S. H.
PUBLIC CALLINGS-WHEN IS A BUSINESS A PUBLIC CALLING--REGULATION
TO WHICH THEY MAY BE SUBJECTED--The Plaintiff, a duly licensed manu-

facturer and distributor of ice, brought this suit to enjoin the defendant
from manufacturing and distributing that product without procuring a
license as required by statute.' This statute made it a misdemeanor to
manufacture, sell or distribute ice except when one had been granted a
license to do so by the Corporation Commission. Sec. 3 of the act provided that a hearing should be held before issuing a license and that the
commission might refuse to grant it unless necessity for the business were
-Wolff Paoking Co. v. court of Industrial Relations (1923), 262 U. S. 522, 43
Sup. Ct. 630.

1
5munn v. Illinois (1876), 94 U. S. 113, 24 L. Ed. 77; People v.. Budd (1892),
117 N. Y. 1, 22 N. E. 670; German Alliance Ins. Co. v. Lewis (1914), 233 U. S. 389,
34 Sup. Ct. 612; National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Wamberg (1922), 260 U. S. 71;
In re Opinion of .Tustice (1903), 55 At. 828.
'Bunting v. Oregon (1917), 243 U. S. 426, 37 Sup. Ct. 435; Holder v. Hardy

(1898), 169 U. S. 366, 18 Sup. Ct. 383; Knoxville Loan Co.V.Harbison (1901), 183

U. s. 13, 22 Sup. Ct 1; Mutual Loan Co. v. Martell (1911), 222 U. S. 225, 32 Sup.
Ct 74; Atkins v. Kansas (1903), 191 U. G. 207. 24 Sup. Ct. 124; McLean v. Arkansas (1909), 211 U. S. 539, 29 Sup. Ct 206; Schmidinger v. City of Chicago
(1913), 226 U. S. 578.
± Oklahoma Session Laws of 1925, Chap. 147.

